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ABSTRACT 
This paper is a contribution to the never settled debate on reference, negation and 
presupposition of existence in the linguistic/philosophical literature. Based on 
Swedish and English data, the discussion is an attempt to present a unified ac-
count of the opposing views put forward in the works of Aristotle, Frege (1892), 
Russell (1905) and Strawson (1950). The starting point is the observed asymmetry 
in Swedish (and English) that negation may precede a quantified subject NP in the 
first position, but not a definite subject NP or a proper name. This asymmetry is 
argued to be due to semantic, rather than syntactic, restrictions. In the model pro-
posed here, negating a topic NP affects the “topic selection”. This is allowed with 
quantified NPs, since negating a quantifier leads only to a modification of the 
topic selection. For definite/generic subject NPs this cannot be allowed, since 
negating a definite NP equals cancelling the topic selection. This leads to a 
‘crash’ at the semantic level. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The question of how negation interacts with referential expressions has been de-
bated in the linguistic literature literally since ancient times, discussed at length 
by Aristotle who in turn was influenced by Plato and the Sophists before him. 
Various (and quite opposing) solutions have been proposed in the literature, 
most notably in the seminal works of Frege (1892), Russell (1905) and Strawson 
(1950). This paper, perhaps somewhat presumptuous, will add further to this 
quite replete area of study, presenting a (still preliminary) sketch of how the 
opposing views of the mentioned scholars may be united. 
                                                 
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Semantics Seminar and the Higher 
Seminar at the Centre for Languages and Literature, Lund University. I would like to thank 
the participants at these seminars for their valuable comments and suggestions. I am 
especially indebted to Christer Platzack and Valéria Molnar for all their support, patience and 
encouragement, and to Lars-Åke Henningsson for helping me to fit the last piece into this 
puzzle. I am of course solely responsible for all errors and shortcomings in this paper. 
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 The starting point for my discussion is the intriguing asymmetry of the fol-
lowing Swedish sentences:  
 
(1) Inte alla (mina vänner) kom till festen. 
 not   all      my      friends   came   to   party-the 
(2) Inte många (av mina vänner) kom till festen. 
 not    many      of   my      friends   came   to  party-the 
(3) * Inte Sven/chefen  kom  till festen. 
    not    Sven  boss-the  came   to   party-the  
(4) * Inte lejon är randiga. 
    not    lions   are striped 
 
All four clauses have a seemingly identical structure – [Neg S V] – but only the 
first two are grammatical. Why does Swedish allow negation of quantified sub-
ject NPs in the first position, as in (1) and (2), but not of definite and (generic) 
indefinite subject NPs, as in (3) and (4)? What is more, this “limitation” seems 
only to apply to the first position in Swedish, since negation can take scope over 
a definite subject NP in mid-position: Den filmen ville inte Sven se (‘That movie, 
Sven didn’t like to see’). The observed asymmetries of (1-4) will be the starting 
point for a more wide-ranging discussion on how negation interacts with topic, 
reference and presupposition of existence. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the shifting philo-
sophical and linguistic views on the semantics of negated sentences that create 
the background for the forthcoming discussion, starting with Aristotle and 
moving on through the centuries to Frege, Russell and Strawson. Section 3 
focuses on the distinction between the semantic notion of narrow and wide 
scope negation, and the syntactic counterparts of constituent and sentential 
negation. Section 4 constitutes the main part of the paper, where I suggest an 
explanation for the asymmetries found in (1-4) above. In my proposal, I intro-
duce a “unifying model” which aims at illustrating the relation between topic, 
reference and presupposition of existence on the one hand, and the interaction of 
these notions with negation on the other. I conclude this article with a few re-
marks on questions/problems in need of further investigation. 
 
2. Background 
As mentioned above, my discussion should be regarded as yet another contri-
bution to the never settled debate on reference, negation and presupposition of 
existence in the linguistic/philosophical literature. Although the field has 
attracted attention since Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, I will just shortly review 
the seminal works of Frege, Russell and Strawson in this section. A reader inter-
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ested in a more in depth discussion on these matters are referred to Horn 1989 
and 1996 and von Fintel 2003. 
2.1 Singular Subjects and Negation 
One of Aristotle’s most influential linguistic insights is his basic assumption that 
“every proposition is of subject-predicate form and is either true or false” (Horn 
1996:1). The simplicity of this statement may conceal its fundamental semantic 
importance – in my proposed model, I will suggest a strengthened version of this 
claim.  
 According to Aristotle, the relation between the subject and the predicate 
can be either affirmed or denied. Thus, there is a contradiction between affirma-
tive and negative sentences with identical subject-predicate form: both cannot be 
true at the same time. This is sometimes referred to as the Law of Contradiction 
(LC): 
 
(5) Socrates is ill. 
(6) Socrates is not ill. 
 
If sentence (5) is true, (6) cannot be true simultaneously. For sentential negation, 
yet another law applies: the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM). LEM “requires 
that of any two opposite propositions, one is true” (Zeijlstra 2005:46). These two 
laws predict, then, that sentences (5) and (6) can be neither true nor false at the 
same time: one of them must be true (by virtue of LEM), and the other must be 
false (by virtue of LC).  
 Aristotle adds an intriguing twist to the truth conditions of the sentences 
above: if the subject denotes an entity that does not exist (in this case Socrates), 
(5) must come out false, while (6) must come out true. This is so, since it is not 
possible for a dead or nonexistent man to be ill, but if he does not exist, it is also 
true that he is not ill1. 
 Approximately two millennia later, Frege returned to the problematic 
notions of reference and existence. In his classic paper “Über Sinn und Bedeu-
tung” (1892), he concludes that referring phrases carry the presuppositions that 
they do in fact refer2. The problem of vacuous subjects is solved by Frege thus: 
                                                 
1 This analysis has been subject to criticism, and it is not clear whether Aristotle was entirely 
convinced of its correctness himself. There is also a logic problem to this analysis, since 
“negative attributes are no more ascribable to nonexistent subjects than are positive attributes” 
(Horn 1989:15).  
2 Frege did not explicitly use the term presupposition. But his definition of the phenomenon is 
used today as the standard definition of presupposition.  
180 
in order for an assertion or a sentence to be either true or false, its presupposition 
must be true or satisfied. According to Frege then, sentences like (5) and (6) 
above are neither true nor false, in case the subject fails to denote. 
 Russell (1905) called Frege’s analysis into question, reviving Aristotle’s 
claim that every proposition must be either true or false. Whereas Frege divided 
any utterance into two separate parts (i.e. the presupposition and the assertion), 
Russell regarded utterances to consist of assertions only. His analysis was based 
on the now famous sentence about the present King of France (a subject referent 
that truly does not exist) 3: 
 
(7) The King of France is bald. 
 
It is important to point out, that in Russell’s analysis the sentence above is not a 
proposition in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. of subject-predicate form. Instead, it is 
“a complex kind of existential proposition” (Strawson 1950:322), consisting of a 
conjunction of three assertions: a) existence, there is a king of France; b) 
uniqueness, there is not more than one king of France; c) property, there is 
nothing which is king of France and is not bald. Russell assumed the following 
semantic form: 
 
(8) ∃x(Kx & ∀y (Ky → y = x) & Bx) 
 
The conjuncts in (8) are all assertions; in Frege’s analysis, the existence of the 
French king would be no more than a presupposition. And obeying to the laws 
of logic, any sentence is false if (at least) one of its assertions is false.  
 Russell analysed the negated counterpart of (7) as ambiguous with regards 
to the scope of negation. The subject NP – in Russell’s analysis an existentially 
quantified conjunct (i.e. There is a king of France) – may or may not be in the 
scope of negation. 
 
(9)   The King of France is not bald. 
(10) ∃x(Kx & ∀y (Ky → y = x) & ¬Bx) 
(11) ¬∃x (Kx & ∀y(Ky → y = x) & Bx) 
                                                 
3 Whereas both Aristotle and Frege experimented with vacuous proper names (Socrates and 
Kepler respectively), Russell deliberately chose a descriptive, definite NP. For Russell, 
“definite descriptions are devices for quantification, not devices for referring” (Reimer & 
Bezuidenhout 2003:1); only proper names are truly referring. As a consequence of this 
analysis, only proper names can function as subjects in the Aristotelian definition of a 
proposition – a conclusion severely criticized by Strawson (1950:323) 
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In case the quantifier has scope over the negation, as in (10), the proposition is 
simply false, since France is a republic. This is due to the fact that the assertion 
of existence is false. If the reverse scope relations hold, as in (11), the propo-
sition turns out true, since there is no king of France. The negated assertion of 
existence correctly predicts that it is not true, that there is a king of France. 
Thus, Russell managed to uphold Aristotle’s claim: sentence (7) must be false if 
the subject (i.e. the French king) does not exist, but the negated counterpart (9) 
may be true. 
 Both Aristotle’s and Russell’s analyses of negative scope and vacuous sub-
jects can be criticized for being somewhat counter-intuitive. In ordinary lan-
guage use, we prototypically do assume the existence of the subject, even in 
negated sentences. This led Strawson (1950) to attack Russell’s view, basing his 
analysis more on language intuition than on predicate logic4. Crucially, Straw-
son made a division between sentences and the use of sentences (later labelled 
statements). Only statements can be evaluated truth-conditionally in a relevant 
context – consequently, only statements can obey LC and LEM. Strawson thus 
argued that statements like (7) and (9) are unambiguous: by uttering such state-
ments the speaker does “commit herself to the existence of a king of France but 
(…) she does not thereby ASSERT (…) the corresponding existential propo-
sition” (Horn 1996:4). By uttering (7) or (9), the speaker implies the existence of 
a French king, but if this implication (or presupposition) clashes with reality, the 
truth value of that statement cannot be evaluated – there would be truth-value 
gap. 
2.2 Quantified subjects and negation 
So far, we have only discussed singular subjects (with true or vacuous refer-
ence). Let us now turn our attention to quantifiers – the category that allowed for 
negation in the first position. Consider (12) and (13) below: 
 
(12) Everyone could not get hold of tickets. 
(13) Not everyone could get hold of tickets. 
 
The sentences differ, obviously, with regards to the position of the negation (at 
least at surface structure). In (12) the quantifier everyone precedes the negation, 
in (13) the negation precedes the quantifier. This could be thought to effect the 
interpretations – but it doesn’t. The standard reading of (12) is in fact (more or 
                                                 
4 “Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary 
language; for ordinary language has no exact logic.” (Strawson 1950:344) 
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less) the same as in (13): it is not the case, that everyone got hold of tickets 
(there are at least some that did not get hold of them). But this is truly surprising, 
given that (12) and (13) then both must be analysed as having the quantifier 
within the scope of the negation (¬∀), regardless of word order. Remember Rus-
sell’s ambiguous analysis of the nonexistent French king, where the existential 
quantifier was either within the scope of the negation (¬∃) or took scope over it 
(∃¬). As Strawson pointed out, the latter reading is generally the only one avail-
able, though: the presupposition of existence seems unimpaired by the negation. 
But for universal quantifiers, the reverse scope relations seem to hold: the nega-
tive operator outscopes the universal quantifier regardless of word order.  
 Admittedly, a logical reading of (12) is possible, in which the quantifier 
does take scope over the negation (∀¬); the analysis renders the marginal read-
ing that for everyone, it is the case that they did not get hold of tickets (i.e. no 
one got hold of tickets). In some languages – for instance German, Dutch and 
Icelandic5 – the QP-NEG interpretation seems to be the only one possible (see 
Zeijlstra 2005:77). This fact is intriguing in itself, given the close relationship of 
these languages with Swedish and English. But the construction is still only 
marginally acceptable, probably for pragmatic reasons I will return to in section 
4.3. 
 Interestingly, scalar quantifiers like many and few seem to display a true 
ambiguous behaviour, however: 
 
(14) Many arrows didn’t hit the target 
(15) Not many arrows hit the target 
 
The interpretation of (14) and (15) may be identical (especially with stress on 
many in (14)): it is not the case that many arrows hit the target. But this is not 
necessarily so. Whereas (15) presupposes that few arrows hit the target, (14) 
only presupposes that many arrows did not – but many arrows may have hit the 
target anyway. The (standard) analysis of (14) is thus that the negation is within 
the scope of the quantifier (∀¬), while the reverse is true for (15) (¬∀).  
 Summarizing the facts above, we have thus seen a rather puzzling pattern 
with regards to quantifiers and the scope of negation: 
 
1. Existential QP (∃) < ¬ = ∃¬ but *¬∃ 
2. Universal QP (∀) < ¬ = ¬∀ but ?∀¬
3. Scalar QP (∀) < ¬ = ∀¬ or ¬∀ 
                                                 
5 Thanks to Halldór Sigurðsson for Icelandic data (p.c.) 
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Later on, when provided with the accurate tools to analyse these relations, I will 
suggest that this pattern is not so asymmetric after all – but we are jumping 
ahead of things. Let us first discuss narrow and wide scope negation. 
 
3. The Scope of Negation: Narrow vs. Wide 
Negation is semantically and syntactically either narrow, taking scope over a 
limited number of clause constituents, or wide, taking scope over the sentence as 
a whole6. In Swedish, sentential negation is prototypically coded grammatically 
as a free adverb, as in (16) below. Constituent negation is coded as either a 
negative prefix, as in (17), or as a free adverb in a restricted domain, such as in 
the non-finite clause in (18), or in the adverbial phrase in (19): 
 
(16) Sven är inte vänlig 
     Sven  is  not    unfriendly 
(17) Sven är ovänlig vs. Sven är vänlig 
     Sven  is unfriendly       Sven   is  friendly 
(18) genom < att inte röka inomhus > gör du oss en stor tjänst 
       by            to  not   smoke  inside          do  you  us    a   great favour 
(19) en < ännu inte helt färdig > tavla 
     a        still   not   quite finished    painting 
 
According to Svenska Akademiens Grammatik7 (SAG from now on), constituent 
negation may only occur in these environments (including adjectival phrases) 
(SAG 4:171). This view will be questioned in my analysis.  
 In Aristotelian logic, there is a crucial distinction between predicate denial 
(sentential negation) and predicate term denial (constituent negation). While 
sentential negation obeys two laws, the Law of Contradiction (LC) and the Law 
of the Excluded Middle (LEM), constituent negation only obeys the former (i.e. 
LC). In the two sentences in example (17), it is obvious that LC holds, since 
both propositions cannot be true at the same time. But LEM does not hold: it is 
possible that Sven is neither friendly nor unfriendly8. In other words, both 
propositions may be false simultaneously. 
 There is also a syntactic distinction between sentential and constituent 
negation. Several basic tests have been proposed in the syntactic literature for 
                                                 
6 Narrow scope negation is sometimes referred to as strong, while wide scope negation is 
weak. In this paper, I will stick to the distinction narrow vs. wide, since I find these terms 
more transparent.  
7 Teleman et al 1999 
8 These predicates are analysed by Horn (1989) as scalar predicates. 
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distinguishing between the two notions; the first set of tests was proposed in 
Klima 1964 (the list is not exhaustive): 
 
• either/too (Swedish: heller/också) 
Sentential negation: Sven is not friendly, and Bertil isn’t, either/*too. 
Constituent negation: Sven is unfriendly, and Bertil is, too/*either. 
 
• tag questions (Swedish: positive or negative assertions) 
Sentential negation: Sven is not friendly, is he? – No, he isn’t. 
Constituent negation: Sven is unfriendly, isn’t he? – Yes, he is. 
 
The standard negation in Swedish invariably triggers these tests. Less negative 
adverbs, such as sällan (‘seldom’) or knappast (‘hardly’), may trigger some of 
them. The accuracy of Klima’s tests has been questioned, however (see e.g. 
Jackendoff 1972, Culicover 1981), since the tests sometimes give rise to con-
flicting results. In the forthcoming discussion, the shortcomings of these tests 
will also become evident. 
 
4. The Proposal 
Returning to our initial problem, let us consider the scope asymmetries of exam-
ples (1-4) above in more detail, repeated here for convenience:  
 
(20) Inte alla (mina vänner) kom till festen. 
     not   all      my      friends   came   to   party-the 
(21) Inte många (av mina vänner) kom till festen. 
    not    many      of   my      friends   came   to  party-the 
(22) * Inte Sven/chefen  kom  till festen. 
        not    Sven  boss-the  came   to   party-the  
(23) * Inte lejon är randiga. 
        not    lions   are striped 
 
These four sentences have what appears to be identical form, i.e. [Neg S V]. 
Given the V2 rule of Swedish, it is the grammaticality of (20) and (21) which is 
surprising, since two constituents seem to precede the finite verb. A possible 
syntactic solution would be to analyze the negation in (20) and (21) as being part 
of the subject NP, i.e. to assume that negation takes narrow scope over the 
quantified NPs. In (22) and (23), the negation may then be analysed as senten-
tial, taking scope over the sentence as a whole – and this leads to a violation of 
V2. The difference between (20, 21) and (22, 23) would then be the scope of the 
negation: narrow vs. wide. 
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 But things are a bit more complicated. Importantly, negation in (20) and 
(21) does in fact trigger Klima’s test for sentential negation: 
 
(24) Inte alla mina kollegor kom till festen, och det gjorde inte alla mina vänner heller. 
    Not   all    my     colleagues came to   party-the, and that  did       not    all     my     friends   either 
 
So even though we may assume a narrow scope reading for the negation in (20) 
and (21) (in order to avoid a V2 violation), the negation is still syntactically 
wide according to Klima’s tests. Note also that the sentences obey Aristotle’s 
two laws: the Law of Contradiction and the Law of the Excluded Middle. The 
affirmative counterpart cannot be true at the same time (LC), and the negative 
and affirmative cannot be false at the same time: if none of my colleagues came 
to the party, it is true that not everyone came9. I address this issue in section 4.2. 
 Next, let us consider the examples with specific or generic singular sub-
jects. Interestingly, we may “save” them from ungrammaticality by creating a 
contrastive reading (sometimes referred to as corrective focus): 
 
(25) Inte Sven, utan BERTIL, kom till  festen   igår 
    not   Sven,   but     BERTIL,   came  to   party-the yesterday 
(26)  Inte lejon, utan TIGRAR, är randiga 
     not   lions,    but    TIGERS     are striped 
 
The first subject is rejected in favour of another subject – the negation appears 
to be taking narrow scope over the definite subject. According to Klima’s test, 
we are dealing with true constituent negation here: 
 
(27) a. Inte Sven, utan Bertil, kom till  festen   igår –  
       not    Sven     but    Bertil  came   to   party-the yesterday 
  b. Ja, det gjorde han. Och Arne också /*heller 
       yes that    did       he     and   Arne     too         either 
 
But how come this analysis isn’t available for the negation in examples (22) and 
(23) above? The wide scope interpretation leads to a violation of V2, while the 
narrow scope interpretation seems impossible, unless a new referent is intro-
duced. 
 Summarizing, we have found some intriguing asymmetries in the Swedish 
sentences (20-24):  
                                                 
9 A negative quantifier like no one asymmetrically entails not everybody. But we may feel 
awkward about regarding a sentence like not everybody came true, if in fact nobody came. 
This is more or less the same problem as in Aristotle’s example: if Sokrates does not exist, 
then it is true that he is not ill. 
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a) Quantified NPs may be negated in first position. They trigger Klima’s test 
for sentential negation, as well as Aristotle’s Law of Contradiction and 
the Law of the Excluded Middle. 
b) Specific or generic singular NPs may be negated in the first position, pro-
vided a new subject NP is introduced. In these cases, the negation takes 
narrow scope over the subject, triggering Klima’s test for constituent 
negation. 
 
I will address the different kinds of subjects separately, starting with definite 
NPs; the main proposal is also presented in this section. In section 4.2 and 4.3 
respectively, universal and scalar quantifiers are fitted into the proposal, and in 
section 4.4 the last category, generic NPs, is accounted for.  
4.1 Singular subjects 
In this section, I will focus on specific, singular subjects – i.e. the ungrammati-
cal cases in (3/22) and (4/23) above. In the first sub-section, I introduce a rough 
sketch, illustrating how I relate the notions of topic, reference and presupposed 
existence to each other. In the next sub-section, I fit negation into the model, 
trying to account for the ungrammaticality I initially promised to discuss. Fi-
nally, we will take a closer look on contrast and its implications for the model 
proposed here. 
 
4.1.1 Topic, reference and presupposition of existence 
Remember Aristotle’s original claim, that every proposition must be of subject-
predicate form. I take this to be a profound and fundamental insight, stating that 
for a proposition to be (semantically) well-formed, we need to predicate some-
thing of something/someone. This view is also predominant in the Chomsky-
tradition, i.e. any sentence must contain a subject (Cardinaletti 1999:151). How-
ever, I think it is somewhat problematic to speak of subjects at this fundamental 
level, since we know that languages may permit omission of the syntactic sub-
ject. The crucial point is that a proposition must contain something about which 
we make a predication. Therefore, I propose to modify Aristotle’s claim into 
stating that every proposition must be of topic-comment form: for a proposition 
to be semantically congruent, a relation between a topic (i.e. what a proposition 
is about) and a comment (what is said about the topic) must be established. 
 Next, let us consider the relation between reference and definite NPs/proper 
names. It is uncontroversial, I think, to assume that specific, definite NPs proto-
typically denote specific referents in a discourse universe. This is sometimes 
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thought of as a pointing device: a proper name or a definite NP denotes/points 
to/refers to a certain entity. As was discussed in section 2, we normally also as-
sume that the entity referred to exists. Vangsnes (1999:25-26) presents a quite 
traditional view on how reference is connected to a presupposition of existence, 
and is therefore a good starting point for our further discussion:  
 
The core referential property of strong noun phrases [e.g. definite NPs] is that 
they carry the presupposition that their referents exist. This presupposition is 
fairly indirect and not logically necessary, but the listener must at least take it that 
the speaker is referring to entities assumed to exist. This presupposition of exis-
tence of course refers to either the real or some fictitious world, hence allowing 
noun phrases like all unicorns and the present King of France to have the same 
basic semantic properties as noun phrases where the noun denotes kinds of enti-
ties that no doubt exist.  
 
Vangsnes calls the presupposition of existence a “referential property” of strong 
NPs (i.e. definite NPs and QPs). This is more or less the same view as advocated 
by Russell, who regarded definite descriptions as quantified conjuncts asserting 
existence. To save an analysis like this, Vangsnes (along with Russell) has to 
assume that for a vacuous subject to carry a presupposition (or assertion) of 
existence, it has to denote ‘kinds of entities’: “the present king of France denotes 
the kind, every instance of which, is a present king of France” (Pafel 2005:37). 
To put it differently: a definite NP that has no existing referent still carries a pre-
supposition of existence, since it denotes a kind rather than an individual. But as 
Pafel acknowledges, “[t]his way of interpreting the definite should come as a 
last resort, not as an early option” (Pafel 2005:37).  
 The analyses of Russell, Vangsnes and Pafel thus assume a direct corre-
lation between referentiality and existence. In my proposal, I would like to sepa-
rate the presupposition of existence from the definite NP, hence only allowing 
reference to be a property of strong NPs.  
 Let me now present a rough sketch of how, in my view, the notions dis-
cussed above may be related:  
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Figure 1: The relation between topic, reference 
and presupposition of existence 
 
 
 The figure should be interpreted in the following way. The semantic level is 
a visualisation of Aristotle’s claim, i.e. that every proposition must be of topic-
comment form. The topic selects an appropriate NP to be predicated about – in 
this case Sven who happens to be the syntactic subject as well10. Since the estab-
lishing of a topic-comment relation is required at the semantic level, a linguistic 
expression and a predicate set must be connected at the linguistic level: the topic 
NP must be related to a given set (the predicate). Relation (2) thus illustrates the 
predication.  
 Specific NPs, such as proper names and definite descriptions, 
prototypically denote referents in the discourse universe (real or fictitious). We 
call this relation reference. This discourse entity is related to some process/state, 
denoted by the predicate. This is relation (3), i.e. the (non-linguistic) event. 
 So we have now separated the topic selection from the reference (i.e. the 
entity in the world). But what about the presupposition of existence? We may 
say that we presuppose the existence of the selected topic referent, because we 
assert something of it – in other words, because a relation exists between the 
topic NP and the predicate. This was also Frege’s standpoint: “If anything is 
asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or compound 
proper names used have a Bedeutung. If therefore one asserts ‘Kepler died in 
misery’, there is a presupposition that the name ‘Kepler’ designates something” 
(Frege 1892:162). This may suggest that the presupposition of existence is not a 
                                                 
10 I do not follow Russell’s division of proper names and definite descriptions. Rather, I take 
it that both categories display the same pattern with regards to the model proposed here. 
Semantic level  Topic       
 
 
 
Linguistic level   Sven 
 
 
 
Discourse Level 
Comment
1 
 
 
Language  
process/state 
[car buying] 
2 x
 
 ∃ 
 
Reality 3 
Sven bought the car 
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‘referential property’ of definite NPs – rather, it is a consequence of the asser-
tion of the relation between the topic NP and the predicate11.  
 Crucially, in my proposal only the first two relations are necessary for lan-
guage: relation 3 (reality) illustrates the (non-linguistic) event in the discourse 
universe. But for a sentence to become a statement (in the Strawsonian sense), 
the third level is relevant. The truth of any statement can be evaluated at the 
semantic level by comparing the linguistic relation (2) with the event relation in 
(3): in the case of figure 1 above the statement is true: Sven does belong to the 
process of buying a car. If one of the relations does not hold (e.g. if there was no 
relation between the entity and the process/state), the statement would come out 
false. 
 Truth-evaluation is dependent on the reference of the NP in relation (2): if 
the reference of the definite NP is vacuous (i.e. if it does not denote), there can 
be no relation between that non-existing entity and a process/state, either (in 
other words there can be no event). Consequently, we have nothing to compare 
the relation in 2 against. At the semantic level, then, a truth-value fails to arise. 
The presupposition of existence thus arises in order to make a truth-evaluation 
possible. It is only when our world knowledge strongly contradicts this presup-
position we get “squeamish” about assigning truth-values – which explains our 
unwillingness to evaluate a statement like The king of France is bald12.  
 Let us now see how negation may be incorporated into this model. 
 
4.1.2 Negation 
Returning to Aristotle, his original claim also stated that the relation between the 
subject and the topic may be either affirmed or denied. In the model proposed 
here, we can illustrate this thus: to deny a predication, negation has to take scope 
over the subject-predicate relation at the linguistic level. We would roughly get 
a figure like the following:  
                                                 
11 Furthermore, Strawson (1964) made the observation that “it is not definite descriptions per 
se which induce existential presuppositions, but only those singular expressions which a 
sentence is understood as being about” (Horn 1989:488). This fact may be incorporated in my 
model – it is the NP selected by the topic we take to exist, whether that may the syntactic 
subject, object or whatever. 
12 If I say, for example, My best friend Sven is bald, a hearer would prototypically presuppose 
that my friend exists, even though he did not previously know that I had a friend called Sven. 
Because of the presupposition, it would be natural to assume that my statement is true – even 
though the statement actually is close to impossible to evaluate truth-conditionally, since a 
true evaluation would require the hearer to actually check the names of all my friends (and 
even to check whether I have any friends to begin with). 
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Figure 2: Sentential negation 
Topic Comment
 
 
The illustration above illustrates, in Aristotle’s terms, predicate denial. It can be 
paraphrased it is not the case that Sven bought the car. Comparing the denied 
predication with the event, we see that the statement is true (i.e. no relation ex-
ists between the referent of Sven and the process/state denoted by the predicate). 
Importantly, the denied predication is still semantically a proposition; Sven is 
still the topic.  
 Following Horn (1989:504), I take it that negation takes scope over the 
predication relation as a whole, over both the subject and the predicate13. Note 
that the reference is left intact, along with the presupposition of existence; the 
topic NP still refers to a referent, and a relation between the topic NP and the 
predicate is still asserted. To put it differently, sentential negation denies that the 
asserted relation between the topic NP and the predicate holds. 
 Let us now (at last) turn to the ungrammatical sentence (3) above, i.e. *Inte 
Sven köpte bilen. We concluded in section 3 that the negation, according to 
Klima’s test, must be analysed as having narrow scope. In other words, it only 
takes scope over the topic NP. In the model proposed above, negation may be 
                                                 
13 Swedish provides rather strong evidence in favour of Horn’s claim. It is a well-known fact 
that negation induces non-specific readings for indefinites within its scope. In Swedish, non-
specific indefinites take the indefinite article någon (or en). Specific indefinites may never 
take någon, it invariable takes en. Now compare the following sentences: (i) En bil står på 
gatan (ii) Någon bil står inte på gatan. Example (i) is decidedly odd with negation (??En bil 
står inte på gatan), while the affirmative counterpart of (ii) is even worse (??Någon bil står 
på gatan). This seemingly strange asymmetry can easily be explained if we assume that 
negation does in fact take scope over the subject-predicate relation as a whole: the specific 
reading of the indefinite in (i) cannot be maintained in the negated counterpart – it has to be 
interpreted non-specifically. 
 
 
 
Sven 
Sven did not buy the car
x
∃ 
NOT
process/state
[car buying] 
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said to cancel the topic selection. This leads to a crash at the semantic level, 
since the proposition is denied of its topic. We may illustrate this:  
 
Figure 3: Negation of specific NPs 
 
 
As is illustrated by figure 3, negating the proper name Sven equals denying that 
the topic of the sentence is Sven14. If we do not introduce another topic, the 
proposition (at the semantic level) is no longer congruent – we have nothing to 
predicate about, so to speak. This readily explains why the contrastive reading in 
(25) is grammatical (see next section). After rejecting, or cancelling the topic 
selection, a new selection is immediately introduced, which saves the propo-
sition from crashing at the semantic level. According to my proposal, then, the 
“ungrammaticality” of (3-4) above is rather “unsemanticality”: cancelling the 
topic selection (by means of narrow negation) cannot be semantically allowed15.  
 
4.1.3. Contrast 
Before moving on to quantified and generic subjects, let us shortly discuss a re-
lated side issue, namely the notion of contrast. We saw that the ungrammatical 
sentences (3/22) and (4/23) above suddenly became grammatical in contrastive 
contexts. Intriguingly, Swedish displays some sort of acceptability scale with 
regards to contrastiveness. Consider: 
 
                                                 
14 Note that cancelling the assignment does not lead to denial of reference; the entity denoted 
by the NP (in this case Sven) is constant. 
15 We would expect languages to be able to have wide scope negation preceding the topic, but 
this is impossible in the first position in Swedish, due to the V2-criterion.  
 
Topic 
 
 
 
Sven 
Comment
Process/state
*Not Sven bought the car 
x
∃ 
NOT
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(28) *Inte BILEN står på gatan. 
       not     car-the    is    on  street-the  
(29) ?Inte bilen står på gatan,  utan CYKELN. 
       not   car-the is    on street-the but      bike-the 
(30) Inte bilen, utan CYKELN, står på gatan. 
   not  car-the  but       bike-the        is   on street-the 
(31) Det är inte bilen, utan CYKELN, som står på gatan 
   That  is  not  car-the   but       bike-the,      that   is    on street-the 
(32) Det är inte bilen som står på gatan,   utan CYKELN 
   That  is  not  car-the  that    is    on street-the but       bike-the,  
(33) Det är inte bilen som står på gatan 
   That  is  not   car-the that is on street-the 
 
 
While (28) is downright ungrammatical, (29) is acceptable and (30) is perfect. In 
Swedish, contrastive readings tend to be conveyed in cleft sentences, as in (31), 
(32) and (33). Interestingly, the rejected subject only optionally needs to be re-
placed in cleft sentences, as is evident from these examples. 
 How can this seemingly strange finding be explained? I concluded in the 
previous section that a new topic selection must be introduced in order to save 
the semantic proposition from incongruence – cleft sentences seem to be a 
strong argument against my proposal. However, this is not necessarily so. 
 First of all, it is important to point out that contrast is the exclusion of 
possible alternatives – and in this sense contrast is also set-creating:  
 
The basic idea behind the notion of kontrast [sic] is the following: if an expression 
a is kontrastive, a membership set M = {…, a, …} is generated and becomes 
available to semantic computation as some sort of quantificational domain. 
  (Vallduví & Vilkuna 1998:83) 
 
Moving on from theory to language data, we may illustrate this generated mem-
bership set in contrastive sentences. Consider the examples below: 
 
(34) Sven didn’t buy the car 
(35) SVEN didn’t buy the car 
(36) It wasn’t Sven who bought the car 
 
In (34), no contrastive reading arises, i.e. no (membership) set of possible car 
buyers is created. The sentence simply states that it is not the case that Sven 
bought the car. In (35) and (36) on the other hand, we immediately get contras-
tive readings – for Sven (at least), it is the case that he did not buy the car. A 
standard assumption, upon hearing utterances like (35) and (36), is that someone 
else bought the car – the listener creates a set of possible car buyers. In (35), this 
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creative assumption is due to a Gricean conversational implicature – we may 
easily cancel this reading: 
 
(37) SVEN didn’t buy the car – and in fact no-one did 
 
This is where (35) and (36) differ: in the cleft sentence (36), the assumption that 
someone else bought a car is presupposed, not merely implicated. Consequently, 
the presupposition of (36) cannot easily be cancelled: 
 
(38) It wasn’t Sven who bought the car – ?? and in fact no-one did 
 
This difference is important, since it proves that cleft sentences in fact have a 
different informational structure than ordinary declaratives. Even if Sven (in this 
case) did not buy a car, it must still be true that the car was bought by someone 
else. And this is so, since it is the car buying that is the topic of the cleft-sen-
tence, not Sven, who is focus. This also explains the presupposition of possible 
car-buyers – we assume that such an event has taken place since the car buying 
is the topic, the backdrop as it were, to the comment. So in Aristotelian terms, 
we still have a proposition – even though the topic happens to be the syntactic 
subordinate clause. We may illustrate this:  
 
Figure 4: Cleft-sentences 
Topic Comment
 
In the cleft sentences (31), (32) and (33) the syntactic relation between the 
grammatical subject and the predicate is not equivalent with the topic-comment 
structure. The negated subject is in fact the focus of the sentence, not its topic. 
So negating the subject does not equal cancelling the topic. Hence, no conflict 
 
 
 
 
process/state 
It wasn’t Sven who bought the car 
Sven
∃ 
NOT
 x 
194 
arises at the semantic level; we may still assume a topic-comment structure. In 
the contrastive declarative sentences (29-33), the grammatical subject is also 
focus in some sense, but at the same time topic16. If the topic assignment is can-
celled, as in (29) and (30), we must introduce a new topic to predicate about – 
and this is preferably done as soon as possible, as in (30). Otherwise, a topic-
comment relation cannot be established at the semantic level – and this leads to 
a crash. 
 
4.1.4 Summary 
In this section, I have proposed a “unifying model”, where Aristotle’s claim that 
every proposition is of subject-predicate form has functioned as the main pillar. 
In my proposal, I have separated the notions of topic selection, reference and 
presupposition of existence. When a topic-comment relation is asserted, a pre-
supposition of existence arises, in order to make a truth-evaluation possible at 
the semantic level. Sentential negation denies that the asserted relation between 
the topic NP and the predicate holds, while narrow negation cancels the topic 
selection. The latter leads to a semantic crash, unless a new selection is intro-
duced. Reference and presupposition of existence are not directly affected by 
negation. In cleft-sentences, negation may precede a definite subject NP in 
Swedish, but this is because the subject is the focus, not the topic, of the sen-
tence.  
4.2 Negated universal quantifiers 
Let us now turn our attention to quantified subjects, and see how they may be 
fitted into the current model. In the first sub-section, I will relate universal 
quantifiers to the notions of topic selection, reference and presupposed exis-
tence. In subsection 4.2.2, I discuss the scope asymmetries found in section 2.2, 
i.e. the observation that negation seems to outscope universal quantifiers 
regardless of word order. 
 
4.2.1. Universal quantifiers 
In the previous section we assumed that specific NPs refer to entities in the dis-
course universe we take to exist. Quantified NPs differ with regards to this ref-
                                                 
16 Admittedly, I have yet to divide how a contrastive sentence like (35) should be analysed 
and incorporated into the model. 
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erence. Intuitively, we may feel that QPs do not refer in the simple way as defi-
nite NPs do17 – but how should we explain this intuition? 
 A standard explanation may be to say that whereas definite NPs refer to 
individuals, quantified NPs refer to sets. Sets are usually dividable, i.e. we may 
refer to a subset of the larger set. But I think it is important to realise that in 
some sense, the reference of any QP is always to a complete set. Let me illus-
trate this. If I say all of my friends, the quantifier obviously refers to that com-
plete set – and if I say many of my friends, the quantifier refers to some part of 
that same set. But crucially I still make some assertion of that set as a whole, 
even when excluding some part of it. Differently put, when I say many of my 
friends I still refer to all my friends, even though I exclude the complete set from 
being the topic of my utterance. This means that we have a number of linguistic 
expressions to choose from when we want to refer to a set: all of them refer to 
the same specific set, but they include/exclude some part of that set from the 
linguistic predication. In our terminology, we have a number of different topic 
selections to choose from when referring to a set. This can be illustrated in 
figure 5: 
 
Figure 5: Quantifiers 
             Topic Comment
 
 
The crucial difference between definite descriptions and quantifiers, then, is the 
topic selection; we have a scale of QPs to choose from when referring to a set. 
And the choice only slightly affects the reference: it may be more or less inclu-
sive, but the whole set is in some way referred to. The choice primarily affects 
the topic – that part of the set we predicate something of. Again, we also see the 
                                                 
17 According to some analyses, quantified NPs do not refer at all. See for example Büring 
2005 (chapter 4) for details. 
 
 
 
<none, some, every> 
    Event 
[Party-going] 
Everyone came to the party 
x
∃ 
∀
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importance of distinguishing between reference and presupposition of existence. 
Regardless of the quantifier choice at the linguistic level, we still presuppose the 
existence of a complete set.  
 In exactly the same fashion as for definite NPs, negation may deny the rela-
tion between the topic NP and the predicate at the linguistic level: it is not the 
case that everyone came to the party. But intriguingly, negation may also cancel 
the topic selection, without loss of semantic congruence. If we negate a QP, by 
saying for example not everyone, what we do is cancel the selection to that par-
ticular referential alternative. In order to save the topic-comment structure, the 
selection immediately “searches for” a new topic alternative, which may be the 
next entry on the scale: 
 
Figure 6: Negation of quantifiers 
Comment          Topic 
 
 
Cancelling the topic selection does not lead to topic denial – only to topic modi-
fication. Prototypically, we assume the new topic to be the next alternative on 
the scale: the standard implicature of not everyone is some, for example. But it is 
important to stress that it is only an implicature; it may easily be cancelled: not 
everyone came – in fact no-one did. Saying not everybody does not equal saying 
some – and we see this from the difference in truth-value assignment18: 
 
(39) Everyone came to the party vs. Not everyone came to the party (LC and LEM) 
(40) Everyone came to the party vs. Some came to the party (not LC, not LEM) 
 
                                                 
18 See also Paradis & Willners (2006) for Swedish data supporting this claim. 
 
 
 
<none, some, all> 
    Event 
[Party-going] 
Not everyone came to the party 
x
∃ 
∀ 
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The pair in (39) is contradictory and cannot be false at the same time: if no-one 
came to the party, it is also true that not everyone came. But the sentences in 
(40) is both affirmative, so consequently they do not obey neither LC nor LEM. 
 This helps us understand a classic logical problem – summarized neatly by 
Sapir (1930:21, taken from Horn 1989:221): 
 
‘Not everybody came’ does not mean ‘some came’, which is implied, but ‘some 
did not come’. Logically, the negated totalizer [not every] should include the to-
talized negative, i.e., opposite or contrary [none], as a possibility, but ordinarily 
this interpretation is excluded and the totalized negative (contrary) is expressed by 
negating the corresponding unitizer or non-specifying selective [not 
{one/any/a}…]. 
 
In our model, this logical problem (i.e. why not everyone is taken to mean not 
some instead of some) may be explained quite naturally. Since negation only 
modifies the topic selection (making it less inclusive), it does not deny the refer-
ence. Hence the negated QP (not everyone) still refers to that set as a whole. As 
a consequence, a negated QP in some way states that of the totalized set, there 
are some members for which this predication does not hold. This is the true 
meaning of a negated quantifier; that the relation may also hold for some other 
members is in fact only implied. 
 
4.2.2 Scope Asymmetries 
Let us now go back to the scope phenomena observed with negation and univer-
sal quantifiers. We saw that regardless of word order, negation seemed to take 
scope over the universal QP. With regards to the proposal sketched above, I 
suggest that the similarity is nothing but an illusion – there is fundamental sco-
pal difference depending on word order. Wide negation takes scope over the 
subject-predicate relation – pragmatically we do however regard the topic as 
being outside the scope of negation (see Horn 1989:502-518). Narrow negation 
takes scope over the topic selection, i.e. over one of the referring alternatives. 
But while the former is a predicate denial, the latter is a predicate affirmation 
(since negation does not take scope over the predicate relation). In the case of a 
universal quantifier, both narrow and wide negation happen to have more or less 
identical interpretations: “predicating something (e.g., flying) of not every man 
amounts to denying it of every man. In the same way, the proposition that no 
man flies is not identical with, but logically equivalent to, the proposition that it 
is not the case that some man flies” (Horn 1989:509).  
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 But we still have a rather problematic issue to address, as has become 
apparent. If sentences with negated quantifiers are affirmed predications, how 
come they trigger Klima’s test for sentential negation? And vice-versa: if nega-
tion is sentential, how come syntax does not rule it out because of the strict V2-
rule of Swedish? 
 An attempt at a syntactic explanation may be formulated along the follow-
ing lines. Klima’s tests are designed for syntactic scope only – and in terms of c-
command, the negated subject does take wide scope. The negation, regarded in 
the syntactic literature as a unique head that projects its own phrasal category 
(Zanuttini 1991), is normally assumed to be generated outside the 
V(erb)P(hrase) (the verb and its complements, including the subject N(oun)P). 
In Swedish, the subject is assumed to move up to (at least) Spec-TP, crossing 
NegP (and possibly cliticizing) on its way. In terms of c-command, then, the 
negated subject obviously constitutes wide scope: it c-commands every con-
stituent below it. This may explain the outcome of Klima’s test. 
 
4.2.3 Summary 
In this section, I have suggested that universal quantifiers differ from definite 
NPs with regards to topic selection. Definite NPs denote individuals, while 
quantified NPs denote sets. But whereas only one selection is possible for defi-
nite NPs, there are several selections (alternatives) available for QPs. This is so, 
since any QP refers to a set as a whole: saying something of no member is also 
saying something about all members. Thus, negating a QP leads only to modifi-
cation of the topic selection. In our proposal, the seemingly strange phenomenon 
that negation always outscopes the universal QP is explained away: it does not. 
For universal quantifiers, it just happens to be a logical fact that predicating 
something of not every man amounts to denying it of every man. 
4.3. Negated Scalar Quantifiers 
In section 2.2, we observed the need to distinguish between universal and scalar 
quantifiers, since they displayed different scopal behaviours. Let us once again 
look at the issues at hand:  
 
(41) Många pilar träffade inte tavlan 
     Many   arrows   hit         not    target-the 
(42) Inte många pilar träffade tavlan 
     Not   many   arrows   hit         target-the 
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Examples (41) and (42) clearly have different interpretations. Whereas the 
quantifier in (41) takes scope over the negation (QP-NEG), the reverse holds for 
(42): the negation takes scope over the quantifier (NEG-QP). 
 Jackendoff (1972:327) elaborates on the differences between (41) and (42), 
and notes that only the interpretation in (42) holds in the passive: 
 
(43) The target wasn’t hit by many arrows 
 
The reading of (42) is also compatible with the standard sentential reading of the 
negation it is not the case that many arrows hit the target (i.e. few arrows hit the 
target). This leads Jackendoff to regard (42) as an instance of S(entence)-nega-
tion (1972:327), while (41) displays VP-negation. But this analysis is somewhat 
confused. In (42), the negated QP is the topic of the (affirmed) proposition. But 
in the passivized sentence (43) the definite NP the target is the topic – the quan-
tified NP is within the comment. And obviously we are dealing with a standard 
sentential negation in (43): it is not the case that the target was hit my many 
arrows. Sentence (43) may thus be illustrated as in figure 4 above, the cleft-
sentence illustration. So, on the basis of Jackendoff’s passivization test, we have 
come no further in understanding the difference between (41) and (42). Let us 
instead turn to our proposal. 
 The seemingly strange interpretative difference has nothing to do with 
scope: negation may take scope over the predicate relation, as in (41), or nega-
tion may take scope over the topic selection, as in (42). The difference in inter-
pretation has to do with the semantic nature of the quantifiers. The following 
table, taken from Horn (1989:237), may shed some light on these differences: 
 
 1   – 1 no / none every / all 
  hardly any / almost no(ne)  
 
 
 
very few 
few 
 
a minority / not half 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
not all 
 
 
 
 
most / a majority 
 
 
very many 
 
many 
quite a few 
several 
some 
  
  
  
  
  
.5  – .5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
half 
     0
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Quantifiers below the middle (i.e. many, quite a few, some) on the positive side, 
and those above the middle (i.e. hardly any, few) on the negative side are toler-
ant. An operator P is tolerant if the conjunction [P(p) & P(¬)] is logically con-
sistent – just as we saw from (41) above (many arrows may have missed and hit 
the target simultaneously). Quantifiers above the middle on the positive side are 
intolerant – the conjunction [P(p) & P(¬)] is logically inconsistent. This fact we 
already observed from the universal QPs. If we relate this to our current pro-
posal, we have an explanation for the different interpretations of the sentences 
(41) and (42) above. 
 Remember that quantifiers always predicate something of a set as a whole. 
A denied predication like (41) above does not exclude the possibility of many 
arrows hitting the target simultaneously. The predicate negation does not affect 
the topic selection or the reference, and a quantifier like many is imprecise and 
tolerant: how many of the totalized set is many? Example (42) on the other hand 
(i.e. not many), can never have the interpretation of (41), since narrow negation 
explicitly cancels the topic assignment of many in favour of some other topic 
alternative on the scale (for example few). 
 Horn’s table also allows us to understand why a sentence like (41), i.e. 
Many arrows didn’t hit the target, does not seem obey the Law of Contradiction. 
It does – but the contradiction is not the affirmative counterpart, but the negative 
QP opposite few: Few arrows didn’t hit the target: 
 
(44) Många pilar träffade inte tavlan  
(45) Få pilar träffade inte tavlan 
 
The sentences above cannot be true at the same time – so they obviously obey 
the Law of Contradiction. But they are not contraries – i.e. they do not obey the 
Law of the Excluded Middle. It is possible for (44) and (45) to be false simulta-
neously, in case no arrows (or all for that matter) hit the target. This is again 
where (45) differs from (42). Even though the negated QP (not many) implicates 
few, it does not mean few. We see this from the different truth-values: if no 
arrows hit the target, it is also true that not many arrows hit the target. But it is 
definitely not true that few arrows hit the target. 
 Summarizing, I have suggested that universal and scalar QPs share a simi-
lar topic selection. Thus, the observed scopal differences between universal and 
scalar QPs can be reduced to a difference with regards to the tolerance of the 
quantifier. In the case of universal QPs, denying something of everyone equals 
predicating something of not everyone. But for scalar QPs, denying something 
of many does not equal predicating something of not many. But crucially, the 
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processes involved are exactly similar: sentential negation denies the asserted 
relation between the topic NP and the predicate, while narrow negation modifies 
the topic assignment.  
4.4 Generic NPs 
Having analyzed singular specific NPs, universal QPs and scalar QPs in their 
interaction with negation, let us now turn to the last category: generic NPs. 
Generic NPs take an intermediate position: they cannot be negated in the first 
position in Swedish (like specific NPs), but they display a close interpretative 
resemblance to universal QPs. Let us see how generic NPs can be related to the 
notions of topic selection, reference and presupposed existence. As always, we 
start by revisiting the data: 
 
(46) Tigrar är randiga (≈ Alla tigrar är randiga) 
    Tigers  are striped           all    tigers  are striped 
(47) *Inte tigrar är randiga (cf. Inte alla tigrar är randiga) 
       Not   tigers are striped            not    all    tigers  are  striped 
(48) Inte några tigrar är randiga 
    Not     any    tigers  are striped 
(49) Inga tigrar är randiga 
     No    tigers  are striped 
 
Example (46) is more or less identical with the quantified equivalent in brackets. 
But only the quantified subject can be grammatically negated in the first position 
– (47) is just as ungrammatical as the singular specific subjects in section 4.1 
above. So, by “adding” a quantifier to the indefinite NP in (48) we are able to 
get a (semantically) narrow scope reading of the negation. But why can negation 
not take narrow scope over generic indefinites?  
 I would like to suggest that generic NPs differ from quantified NPs with 
regards to reference and topic selection. In my view, QPs are sets made up of its 
individual parts (a set of individuals), while generic NPs are sets made up from 
a closed, undividable set of properties. From a simple test, we may show that 
generic NPs refer to undividable sets, while quantified NPs refer to dividable 
sets: 
 
(50) All tigers are striped, except two. 
(51) ??Tigers are striped, except two. 
 
Tigers (as a generic, closed set) either have the property of being striped, or they 
have not. What we predicate of a generic subject must hold as a common prop-
erty of that set as a whole. True, there may be exceptions (for example, albino 
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tigers lacking stripes). But the exceptions do not belong to that closed set, as it 
were, but to a completely different set (for example, a generic set of albino 
properties).  
 If we return to the topic selection, keeping in mind the differences between 
QPs and generics, we have a straightforward explanation of the asymmetries in 
(46-49). A generic NP refers to a closed set of properties, not to a set made up 
from individuals. Thus, no scale of alternatives is available for the topic selec-
tion to choose from (just as in the case of specific NPs). This is so, since if we 
cannot divide the referent into smaller units, the topic selection cannot induce 
alternatives. Thus if we cancel the topic selection by means of negation, we 
immediately deny the proposition of its topic. Consequently, a new topic must 
be explicitly introduced. This is why contrastive sentences are grammatical with 
generic NPs, just as with specific singular NPs (example (34) above is repeated 
here): 
 
(52) Inte lejon, utan TIGRAR, är randiga 
    Not   lions    but      tigers        are  striped 
 
Quantifiers induce alternative topic selections, since the referent set is dividable. 
So cancelling one topic alternative implicates another on the same scale – we do 
explicitly need to introduce a new topic. Generic NPs refer to undividable sets, 
which is why no topic alternatives are induced. 
 
5. Summary 
In this paper, I have proposed a still preliminary account for how the notions of 
reference, presupposition of existence and negation are related. Based on the 
asymmetries of four Swedish sentences, I have put forward a model trying to 
unite the opposing views put forward by Aristotle, Frege, Russell and Strawson.  
 Aristotle’s claim that every proposition must be of subject-predicate form 
has been the fundamental idea behind my model. I have taken this claim to mean 
that every proposition must predicate something of something, i.e. be of topic-
comment form. The topic selects a linguistic expression, which is related to a 
predicate. This asserted relation I have taken to be the predication. I have argued 
against the view that presupposition of existence is a “referential property” of 
definite NPs; instead I argue (following Frege) that the presupposition of exis-
tence arises because the predication is asserted.  
 In my model, I have made a division between language and reality, to cap-
ture Strawson’s observation that only statements (i.e. the use of sentences) may 
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be true or false. In order to evaluate the truth of a statement, the linguistic rela-
tion (the predication) must be compared to the (non-linguistic) event relation. If 
a topic NP has vacuous reference, there is no event to compare the linguistic 
relation to, hence we feel ‘squeamish’ about assigning truth-values to such 
statements. 
 Sentential negation takes scope over the subject-predicate relation as a 
whole, denying that the asserted relation holds. Narrow negation takes scope 
over the topic selection. In my view, quantifiers always refer to complete sets, 
but we may choose a subset of the larger set to predicate about. Quantifiers thus 
induce topic alternatives, and negating the topic selection implies that the next 
item on the scale is the topic. This is why grammar allows not every/many 
arrows hit the target. For singular and generic NPs, cancelling the topic selec-
tion leads to a crash at the semantic level, unless a new topic is explicitly intro-
duced. This is so, since we cannot assume a scale of alternative topics – hence, 
the proposition is denied of its topic. This is why grammar does not allow *Not 
Sven bought the car.  
 I would like to emphasize that the proposed model should be regarded as 
work in progress. It may be too simplistic, and even though I think it explains 
some scopal phenomena in English and Swedish quite accurately, it has yet to 
stand the test of the rest of the world’s languages. Also, I have deliberately cho-
sen not to discuss indefinite NPs, and have yet to fit them into this model. A re-
search question in need of investigation is the exact nature of the first position in 
Swedish. Is it a “free position” for any clause constituent, or is it a quite 
restricted topic position? The answer to this question may have serious imple-
mentations for the issues discussed in this paper. 
 
Johan Brandtler, Lund University 
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